Jüri Eintalu, 19/lug/2015

[b]Interactive and dynamic models of Cournot and Bertrand duopolies[/b] Most simple models have been used. The following concepts have been illustrated: - reaction functions; - Nash equilibrium; - cartel agreement; - convergence in a dynamic game; - iterated elimination of dominated strategies in a static game.

Two competing firms are each one choosing one's quantities of production of the same product. They are selling with the same optimal price. A linear demand curve has been assumed. It has been also assumed that there are no fixed costs and that the model is symmetrical - both firms have the same, constant marginal cost.

• 1. Cournot Duopoly - Reaction Function
• 2. Cournot Duopoly
• 3. Cournot Duopoly - Convergence
• 4. Cournot Duopoly - Elimination
• 5. Cournot Duopoly - Calculations

Two competing firms are each one choosing the prices of one's products, which are identical. They are both choosing correspondingly optimal quantities of production. A linear demand curve has been assumed. It has been also assumed that there are no fixed costs and that the model is symmetrical - both firms have the same, constant marginal cost. The parameters have been chosen so as to make the cartel agreement theoretically possible.

• 1. Bertrand Duopoly - Reaction Function
• 2. Bertrand Duopoly
• 3. Bertrand Duopoly - Convergence
• 4. Bertrand Duopoly - Calculations